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I. Introduction 
The purpose of this note is to survey certain Korean legislations the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) compatibility of which were addressed in the recent WTO
anti-subsidy cases involving Korea and Hynix Semiconductor Ltd. (“Hynix”), one of
the world’s largest semiconductor producers based in Korea. These legislations were
introduced and enacted in the aftermath of Korea’s financial crisis in 1997. For the
ensuing survey, the factual background and chronology of the Hynix WTO
proceedings, coupled with an analysis of the relevant WTO treaty provisions and
case law, will be first looked at. This will be followed by a discussion of the Panel
and, where appropriate, Appellate Body treatment of the legislations involved and
then by a probe into related legal instruments.  
1. Background
The countervailing duties (“CVD”) disputes between Korea and the U.S. in
respect of Hynix arose from a CVD investigation by the U.S. Department of
Commerce (“DOC”) on imports of Dynamic Random Access Memory
Semiconductors (“DRAMS”) from Korea. The DOC imposed countervailing duties
after it determined that Hynix had received massive subsidies from the Government
of Korea (“GOK”) in the form of financial contributions by its creditors.1)
Specifically, the DOC determined that the financial contributions for Hynix were
provided by a number of banks with GOK ownership or control, as well as by a host
of private financial institutions that were “entrusted or directed” by the GOK to do
so.  
Korea subsequently contested before a WTO Panel the consistency of the
Decision Memorandumwith, among others, the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (the “SCM Agreement”). It thus argued in US DRAMSthat
the participation of private lenders in the financial restructuring of Hynix was solely
based on commercial considerations and therefore fell outside the disciplines of the
1) U.S. Department of Commerce, Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Dynamic Random
Access Memory Semiconductors from the Republic of Korea, 68 FR 37122 (June 23, 2003), available at
wais.access.gpo.gov (hereinafter “Decision Memorandum”).
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SCM Agreement.2) The US DRAMSPanel was overall receptive to the claims of
Korea and consequently ruled that the USDOC had failed to establish a sufficient
evidentiary basis to impose countervailing duties on imports of Hynix DRAMS.3)
Korea’s triumph at the Panel level, however, was dealt a blow when, as will be seen
shortly, the WTO Appellate Body reversed the Panel in June, 2005 by ruling that the
US Panel had erred with respect to several legal issues including, inter alia, its
interpretation of the terms “direction” and “entrustment” as envisaged under the
SCM Agreement.4)
2. The Concept of Direction and Entrustment in WTO Jurisprudence
1) Treaty Provision — Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement
In the WTO context, the law of subsidies is codified and regulated under the
SCM Agreement. SCM Agreement Article 1.1 provides that a subsidy shall be
deemed to exist where there is a “financial contribution” that confers a “benefit.”
Article 1.1(a)(1) further provides that there is a “financial contribution” by “a
government or any public body within the territory of a Member” (collectively
referred to as “government” in the SCM Agreement) where:
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans,
and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g.
loan guarantees);
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g.
2) Panel Report, United States — Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory
Semiconductors from Korea(WT/DS296/R), 21 December, 2004, available athttp://docsonline.wto.org (hereinafter
“US DRAMS”).
3) In a parallel proceeding involving the European Communities (Panel Report, European Communities —
Countervailing Measures on Dynamic Random Access Memory Chips from Korea(WT/DS299/R), 21 January,
2005, available athttp://docsonline.wto.org [hereinafter “EC DRAMS”]), a separate WTO Panel decided that the EC
had not erred in finding at least some of the restructuring programs of Hynix, which were undertaken subsequent to
the Korean financial crisis in 1997-98, as violative of the SCM Agreement.
4) Appellate Body Report, United States — Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access
Memory Semiconductors from Korea(WT/DS296/AB/R), 27 June, 2005, available athttp://docsonline.wto.org
(hereinafter “DRAMS AB Report”).
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fiscal incentives such as tax credits) [footnote omitted];
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure,
or purchases goods; 
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or
directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions
illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices
normally followed by governments.
Article 1.1(a)(1) subparagraphs (i) to (iii) thus contemplate three specific
instances that may be considered to constitute a direct financial contribution by a
government.  Subparagraph (iv) adds that such financial contribution may also exist
indirectlywhere the government has entrusted or directed a private body to carry out
a type of the financial contributions listed in subparagraphs (i) to (iii).  In other
words, in the framework of the SCM Agreement, a financial contribution will be
deemed to be present where the government or a public body itself provides a
financial contribution, or where the government entrusts or directs a private body to
do the same.
2) Appellate Body Analysis of Article 1.1(a)(1)
In the DRAMS AB Report, he Appellate Body attempted to distil the meaning of
the terms “directs and entrusts.” At the outset of its analysis, the Appellate Body
noted that under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement, no product may be
countervailed in the absence of a financial contribution, since a “financial
contribution” by a government or public body is an essential component of a
“subsidy” in the sense envisaged by Article 1.1(a)(1). Furthermore, the Appellate
Body made it clear that situations involving purely private conduct — that is,
conduct that is in no way attributable to a government or any emanation thereof —
cannot constitute a “financial contribution” under the SCM Agreement.5)
In constructing the concept of “entrusts” and “directs,” the Appellate Body noted
that the term “entrusts” connoted the action of assigning responsibility to a person for
5) DRAMS AB Report, paras 106-107. 
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a task or an object.6) In the Appellate Body’s view, “delegation” (the word used by
the US DRAMSPanel to allude to entrustment) may well be a formal or informal
means by which a government imparts responsibility to a private body to carry out a
governmental function. Yet the Appellate Body went on to find that, in addition to
acts of delegation, there may be other formal or informal means by which a
government could entrust a private body.  Accordingly, the Appellate Body found the
Panel holding limiting the scope of “entrusts” to acts of “delegation” to be overly
narrow.
As for the term “directs,” the Appellate Body noted that the requirement under
paragraph (iv) that the private body be directed “o carry out” a government function
meant that an act of directing implied the existence of authority on the part of the
person or entity that “directs” vis-à-vis the person or entity so directed.7) In the
context of paragraph (iv), the Appellate Body stated that a “command” (the term
used by the Panel below interchangeably with direction) would undoubtedly be one
form or method by which a government can exercise authority over a private body in
the sense foreseen by Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv). Aside from issuing formal commands,
however, governments are likely to employ other subtle and less coercive means to
exercise authority over a private body. Thus, as with “entrusts,” the Panel’s
interpretation of the term “directs” that was limited to acts of “command” was found
to be restrictive in scope. From the preceding analysis, the Appellate Body concluded
that not all government acts would necessarily amount to entrustment or direction.
As agreed upon by the United States and Korea alike, the Appellate Body took the
view that a “mere policy pronouncement” by a government or any legitimate or
inadvertent act of market regulation by public authorities would not, by itself, be
equated with entrustment or direction for purposes of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv).8)
II. Legislations Surveyed
In its Decision Memorandum, the DOC considered various Korean legislations
pursuant to which it determined the Korean government could entrust or direct
6) Id, para 110. 
7) Id, para 111.
8) Id, para 114. 
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Hynix’s lenders and the banking sector of Korea more in general to provide
preferential financing aimed at the troubled chipmaker. These legislations included
Prime Minister’s Decree No. 408 on the Responsible Management of Financial
Institutions and the Guarantee of Transparency in Financial Administration (“Prime
Minister’s Decree No. 408”), the Public Funds Oversight Act, and the Corporate
Restructuring Promotion Act. According to the DOC, each of these legislative
measures was ambiguous enough in wording and contents to enable the GOK to
seize control of the Korean banking system in support of Hynix. In what follows,
each of the legislations and the Panel treatment of them in the abovementioned WTO
disputes, among others, will be considered in turn. Critical commentary will be
attempted as appropriate in the process. 
1. Prime Minister’s Decree No. 408
With respect to the Prime Minister’s Decree No. 408, the DOC determined in its
Preliminary Determinationthat:
For instance, the Prime Minister’s Decreeat Article 5 states that the financial
supervisory agencies can request cooperation from financial institutions for
the purpose of the stability of the financial market, or to attain the goals of
financial policies. As noted above, the financial system in the ROK has been
going through a crisis that could be the type of situation in which this
exception would be applied. A further exception that would allow GOK
influence over the banks is included in Article 6 of the Prime Minister’s
Decree. Article 6 states that the Minister of MOFE and KDIC shall, unless
they exercise their rights as shareholders of any of the Financial Institutions,
procure that the Financial institution, which was invested by the {GOK} or
KDIC, can be operated independently under the direction of the Board of
Directors thereof’’ (emphasis added). As noted above, because the GOK is
part-owner in many commercial banks, an exercise of its shareholder rights
could allow the GOK an opportunity to become involved in the operations of
the banks.9)
9) US DOC, Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Dynamic Random Access Memory
Semiconductors from the Republic of Korea, 68 FR 16766 (April 7, 2003), available atwais.access.gpo.gov
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The DOC thus focused on Articles 5 and 6 of Prime Minister Decree No. 408 as
proof of GOK direction or entrustment of Hynix’s creditors. Yet the Panel was not
persuaded by the agency’s analysis of the decree.  
In the DOC’s view, Article 5 could be a potent tool for the financial supervisory
authorities in requesting cooperation from financial institutions. From the Panel’s
perspective, however, such a request for co-operation could not objectively be
adjudged to be evidence of affirmative acts of delegation or command.10) This is
because, in principle, requesting co-operation in a certain matter would be distinct
from affirmatively directing or entrusting a private body for the purpose of providing
a countervailable subsidy. In terms of evidence, moreover, the Panel noted that the
DOC failed to adduce any evidence that Article 5 had been invoked or actually
exercised in a way that enabled the GOK to entrust or direct non-public
intermediaries. Instead, the DOC merely asserted that a financial crisis “could be the
type of situation in which [Article 5] would be applied.” As such, the Panel found the
DOC analysis to be a mere hypothesis and hence insufficient in terms of probative
value to establish positive acts of delegation or command by the GOK under Article
5.11)
As for Article 6 of Prime Minister Decree No. 408, the Panel noted that the
DOC’s analysis primarily pertained to the legal authority of the GOK to intervene in
the activities of government-owned banks through its shareholding clouts. Yet, as
such analysis did not necessarily entail affirmative acts of delegation or command,
the Panel rejected it as objective proof of GOK direction or entrustment in relation to
Hynix.12)
In the end, the Panel made it clear that evidence regarding simple exercise of
shareholder rights by a government may not underpin a finding of entrustment or
direction under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement.
(hereinafter “Preliminary Determination”), at 16774.
10) According to the US DRAMSPanel, “[i]t follows from the ordinary meanings of the two words “entrust” and
“direct” that the action of the government must contain a notion of delegation (in the case of entrustment) or
command (in the case of direction)”. US DRAMS,para. 7.31.
11) US DRAMS, para 7.76.
12) Id. para 7.77.
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13) The decree was published in the Korean official gazette (Instruction No. 408, November 2000, to be
effective immediately).
14) Violations of this order are sanctioned under the Government Officials Act that penalizes disregarding
orders from superiors. SeeHynix, Initial Arguments on the Directed Credit Issue in DRAMs from Korean — CVD
Investigation(March 2003), at 27-28.  
15) Panel Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels(WT/DS273/R), 7 March, 2005,
available athttp://docsonline.wto.org (hereinafter “Korea Shipbuilding”), paras 7.389-7.393. 
1) Comments
Prime Minister Decree No. 408 was promulgated on November 13, 2000 in the
midst of, as will be seen below, a sea change in the financial regulatory regime and
milieu of Korea in the aftermath of the liquidity crisis in 1997. The chief purpose of
the Decree was to prohibit undue involvement of government officials in the
management operations of Korean banks.13) The decree specifically bars government
officials working in MOFE and FSC, among others, from meddling with the fiscal
operations of all banks whether they are commercial or specialized.14)
In the context of WTO dispute settlement, the Decree was also considered in
Korea-Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels.15) In that case, the EC
claimed that while Article 6 of the Decree purports to guarantee the independence of
banks in which the Government of Korea has ownership, Article 5 specifically
requires these banks to co-operate with the GOK “for the purpose of stability of the
financial market” and “to attain the goals of financial policies.” Under the decree,
governmental instructions to these ends can be given orally or by telephonic means.
As maintained by Korea, on the other hand, a government is obliged to enforce
financial policies related to ensuring stability of the fiscal markets. Financial
institutions, in return, are expected and, on occasion, statutorily required to comply
with legitimate public policies aimed at normalizing the markets. Seen in this
context, Article 5 of the Prime Minister’s Decree was but a legislative provision
authorizing the Government of Korea to adopt and implement financial policies.
Unlike the EC claim, moreover, the Decree was enacted to ensure independence of
the banks in which the GOK came to acquire an ownership stake.  In this regard,
Korea pointed out that the Prime Minister’s Decree embodied the commitment of the
Government of Korea to the IMF that:
In the interim [i.e., pending re-privatization of government-owned commercial
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banks], banks will be operated on a fully commercial basis and the
government will not be involved in the day-to-day management of the
banks.16)
The decree, accordingly, was never meant to be an apparatus for governmental
control of the banking and financial sector in Korea. 
From the Shipbuilding Panel’s standpoint, there was no hint or suggestion in the
Decree itself that it was intended to confer on the government any power to compel
reluctant banks to participate in corporate restructuring.  Rather, the primary aim of
the Decree was ensuring the stability of the financial markets as envisaged in Article
1.17) Article 1 provides that the basic rationale for the Decree is to “procure that the
Government shall go through objective and transparent formalities in tablishing
financial policies or conducting supervision over financial institutions, and to
exclude unfair outside intervention in management of financial institutions, etc. so
that financial institutions, etc. can operate their businesses more independently,
taking more responsibility.”18) The Panel further noted that pursuant to Article 5.1 of
the Decree, “[i]f the Financial Supervisory Agencies request cooperation or
assistance of Financial Institutions, etc. for the purpose of stability of the financial
market, etc. (excluding the request for data in relation to routine management
activities), such request shall be made in writing or through a meeting.”19) Even
though Article 5.2 provides that in cases of urgency such request may be made orally
or by phone, it further provides that “[i]n this case, the Financial Supervisory
Agencies shall notify such request to the relevant Financial Institutions, etc. in
writing without delay.”20) Upon review of the legislative texts, the Panel concluded
that pursuant to the Decree, the GOK could, at least in certain circumstances, induce
private banks to carry out actions related to securing and maintaining stability in the
financial markets. In the view of the shipbuilding Panel, however, the EC failed to
establish that such “stability” was linked to the corporate restructuring of shipyards,
16) Annex to Korea’s 13 November 1998 Letter of Intent to the IMF as quoted in Id.
17) In this respect, the Korea-ShipbuildingPanel found it “difficult to conceive of any country that does not have
a legislative or regulatory framework enabling the government to intervene in the market for the purpose of
maintaining financial stability”. Id. footnote 225.
18) Korea-Shipbuilding, para 7.39 (emphasis original).
19) Id. (emphasis original). 
20) Id.
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21) Id. para 7.392 (emphasis original). 
if at all.
In the final analysis, the Panel opined that “the issue of entrustment or direction
does not have to do with a government’s power, in the abstract, to order economic
actors to perform certain tasks or functions. It has instead to do with whether the
government in question has exercisedsuch power in a given situation subject to a
dispute.”21) In this regard, not unlike the DRAMS Panel, the Panel noted that EC
failed to proffer any evidence that the Prime Ministerial Decree No. 408 was in fact
relied on, invoked or used by the GOK for the purpose of directing or entrusting
private bodies in a restructuring context. Accordingly, in and of itself, the Prime
Ministerial Decree No. 408 could not amount to evidence of GOK entrustment or
direction with respect to any private intermediary. To sum up, with respect to the
Prime Ministerial Decree, both the DRAMSand ShipbuildingPanels did not consider
it as concrete proof of GOK direction or entrustment of any private entity in
contravention to the SCM Agreement.
2. Public Funds Oversight Act
Another piece of Korean legislation probed by the USDOC in their CVD
investigation of Hynix was the Public Funds Oversight Act (“PFOA”). With respect
to the PFOA, the US determined that:
The DOC also found that the GOK was able to leverage its control of the
financial sector to assist Hynix through enactment of the Public Fund
Oversight Act. This law required Korean private banks to sign contractual
commitments with the government (Memoranda of Understanding or MOUs)
in exchange for the massive recapitalizations they received from the
government.  These MOUs provided the government with a contractual right
to intervene in the day-to-day business and credit decisions of Korean banks.
The MOUs specify financial soundness, profitability, and asset quality targets,
and include a detailed plan for implementation …
In particular, MOUs allowed the GOK to require that the bank management be
changed or the bank be restructured such that employees can be fired, the bank
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can be restructured, or the KDIC can order that the bank be merged with
another healthier bank. Many of Hynix s creditors, suffering from capital
shortages and seriously over-exposed with respect to Hynix, had no choice but
to accept the strict requirements of the MOUs. These legislatively-mandated
contractual agreements provided the GOK with substantial control in directing
credit to Hynix.22)
The DOC thus found that the use of MOUs allowed the GOK to set various
financial targets, and review their implementation. The Panel, however, found that
the DOC gave undue weight to these MOUs. From the Panel’s standpoint, even
assuming arguendo23) that the DOC was correct in determining that the GOK had
relied on the MOUs to become “directly involved in the fiscal operations of the
bank,” the DOC failed to adduce any evidence that such involvement in fact
exceeded ensuring compliance with the applicable targets, or otherwise resulted in
government entrustment or direction of a private proxy. Accordingly, the DOC
treatment of the PFOA could not be considered as establishing an affirmative act of
delegation or command by the Korean government with respect to any Hynix
creditor.24)
1) Commentary
In the wake of the liquidity crisis in 1997 that left the whole country paralyzed,
the Government of Korea came to acquire temporary equity ownership in several
banks with no previous affiliation or ties to it.25) In the process, the GOK entered into
MOUs with certain banks in which the injection of public funds bestowed on the
GOK a majority ownership.26) In a written submission to the EC, the GOK went
through the rationale for the MOUs in the following vein:
In the aftermath of a serious financial crisis, the GOK needed to inject public
22) The First Written Submission of the U.S. in US DRAMS( ay 2004) (hereinafter “U.S. First Written
Submission), paras 82-83.  
23) Meaning “for the sake of argument”.
24) US DRAMS, para 7.78.
25) See Statement by Korea in US DRAMS.
26) The injection was mostly done through Korea Depository Insurance Company (“KDIC”).
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27) Government of Korea, Additional rebuttal comments of the Government of Korea on the Commission’s
provisional determination in the anti-subsidy investigation concerning imports of DRAMs from Korea(May 2003),
at 9.
28) Hynix, Initial Arguments on the Directed Credit Issue in DRAMs from Korean — CVD Investigation(March
2003), at 28-29. 
29) FSC took the lead in evaluating banks, and ordering failed banks to close. The FSC also acted to begin the
funds into certain commercial banks. This need for the GOK to become a
substantial shareholder in various banks, however, has not changed the day-to-
day management of those banks. The GOK enacted laws and regulations to
guarantee the independence of the banks. In doing so, the GOK has been
working to strengthen bank independence and to build firewalls to prevent any
improper government interference in the day-to-day decisions of the banks.
That is why there are explicit rules prohibiting government officials from
interfering with banks’ lending decisions. That is also why there are explicit
rules holding bank officials responsible for loan decisions that do not have a
commercial basis.
[…] These MOUs do not allow the GOK to control the day-to-day decisions
of the banks.  Rather, the MOUs provide a framework for evaluating broader
performance measures at the banks. Once the MOU is executed, as long as the
banks maintain their operational goal, the GOK is prohibited from getting
involved in the day-to-day operation, and in November 2000, such decision
was formally instituted by the Prime Minster’s Decree.27)
As the above demonstrates, the aim of the MOUs was not to confer on the GOK
any decision-making power concerning individual credit decisions, but to ensure
non-interference by the government in the decision making process of the bank
involved.  In addition, at the core of the post-1997 reform was the recognition that
independent supervision, not government direction, was in order for all financial
sectors.28) To this end, an independent FSC was created to consolidate and improve
supervision of financial institutions. Prior to the 1997 crisis, supervision of these
institutions was mainly in the hands of the Minister of Finance and Economies
(“MOFE”). Starting in 1998, regulatory control sifted away from MOFE to FSC and
to other independent regulatory agencies including the Final Supervisory Services
(“FSS”), the supervisory arm of FSC.29)
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3. The Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act
The last legislation considered by the U.S. in their CVD proceeding was the
Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act (CRPA). With respect to the CRPA, the
USDOC found that: 
[d]ecisions made by the October Creditors’ Council were subject to the newly
enacted CRPA. Under this Act, banks holding 75 per cent of a company’s debt
may set the financial restructuring terms for all of a company’s creditors.
Hynix’ government-owned and controlled creditors accounted for a
substantial majority of [Hynix’s] outstanding debt at that time, an amount
sufficient to set the terms for all banks ….30)
In the DOC’s view, within the framework of the CRPA, the GOK could coerce
Group C creditors (that is, private creditors) into taking part in the October 2001
restructuring of Hynix because this particular group was at the whim of the
Creditors’ Council which in turn was dominated by Group A and B creditors (owned
or controlled by the GOK).31)
According to the Panel, there were two main issues to be considered in respect of
the CRPA. The first issue was whether the DOC could properly have found that the
Creditors’ Council was in fact controlled by Group A and B creditors by virtue of
holding at least 75 percent of the voting rights.  The second issue was whether there
was a proper evidentiary ground to sustain the DOC finding that Group C creditors
were constrained by decisions of the Creditors’ Council lacking, as a result, any
meaningful ability to make volitional commercial decisions.32)
As for the first issue, the Panel found a disparity between the pertinent record
evidence and the DOC finding that groups A and B held at least 75 per cent of the
process of developing and implementing stricter prudential regulations, and creating a new watchdog agency (i.e.
FSS) to implement these new regulations and policies.
30) Decision Memorandum, page 54.
31) The DOC found that the financial contributions for Hynix were provided by public bodies (Group A
creditors including Korea Development Bank (“KDB”)), by a number of private, yet GOK owned or controlled
banks (Group B Creditors including Korea Exchange Bank), and by private entities (Group C creditors including
Kookmin). See US DRAMS, para 7.8.  
32) US DRAMS, paras 7.80-7.89.
Korean Legislations and Related Legal Instruments in the WTO Anti-Subsidy Jurisprudence
233
33) According to a document prepared by the US Embassy in Seoul at the request of the DOC, those
“institutions where [GOK] is the first shareholder” held 63.3 per cent of the voting rights. Furthermore, during the
US DRAMS proceeding, the US reported that the share of the Creditors Council vote held by Group A and B
creditors at the time of the October 2001 restructuring was “above 65 [per cent].” US DRAMS, para 7.81.  
34) Id.
35) Id. para 7.82.
36) Each creditor could choose from the following three options: (1) extend new loans, convert a majority of
their debt to equity, and extend maturities on the remainder; (2) refuse to extend new loans, convert a smaller portion
of their debt to equity, and forgive the remainder; or (3) exercise appraisal rights against their outstanding debt based
on the liquidation value of the company, as determined by an independent auditor, and walk away. See Decision
Memorandum, at 20.
37) They are Korea First Bank, Kwangju Bank, Kyungnam Bank, and HSBC. 
votes.33) Accordingly, the DOC finding was found devoid of substantial evidentiary
grounds.34)
As for the second issue, the gist of the USDOC’s contention was that “the terms
on which these creditor banks terminated their relationship with Hynix were dictated
by the banks that mattered in this case, namely the large government-owned and
controlled creditors.”35) In respect of this particular finding, the Panel paid close heed
to the fact that creditors were given three options36) to choose from, and that four
creditors37) from Group B and C had exercised their appraisal rights pursuant to the
third option crafted by the Creditors Council. In addition, the Panel criticized the
DOC for overlooking the record evidence that, under the terms of the CRPA, the
dissenting creditors were entitled to decline the terms of payment and “buy out” price
put forward by the Creditors’ Council if they were unreasonable or otherwise
deemed unacceptable.
On the basis of these considerations, the Panel rejected the US determination that
the government-owned and controlled creditors could dictate the terms of the
October 2001 restructuring of Hynix. 
1) CRPA (EC)
In EC DRAMS, the Panel noted the EC finding that the CRPA had been enacted
in August 2001 with a view to streamlining corporate restructuring through a
majority voting procedure. Before the enactment of the CRPA, corporate
restructuring in Korea was based on private agreements entered into between the
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38) EC DRAMS, para 7.12.
39) DRAMS AB Report, para 171. 
40) Id., para 179. 
41) The CRPA was initially enacted as a temporary, stop-gap measure and expired at the end of 2005. On 3
August, 2007, the CRPA was re-enacted with validity period until 31 December, 2010.
42) SeeClearly and Gottlieb, Restructuring News Letter(December, 2004), available athttp://www.cgsh.com/
files/tbl_s47Details%5CFileUpload265%5C302%5CCGSH_Restructuring_Newsletter_Dec_2004.pdf.
distressed company and their creditor banks. At the time of the October 2001
Restructuring Programme, on the contrary, the Panel found that a government-driven
policy entrenched in the framework of the CRPA had “considerably circumscribed
the options of dissenting creditors.”38)
2) Appellate Body Findings
As noted above, the USDOC found in the case below that, under the CRPA,
creditors holding three-fourths of a firm’s outstanding debt could set and foist the
terms of restructuring on all of that firm’s creditors. During the Panel proceeding,
Korea disputed this DOC finding by adducing evidence that, under Article 29 of the
CRPA, three creditors of Hynix had actually exercised their mediation rights for the
purpose of being “bought out by other creditors at a price determined through
mediation.”39) The Panel was receptive to the claims of Korea under the CRPA based
on said evidence. The Appellate Body, however, reversed the Panel finding by noting
that the evidence at issue was not part of the universe of evidence before the USDOC
(that is, it was non-record evidence). As a result, the Appellate Body found the Panel
to have failed in undertaking “an objective assessment of the matter before it” as
required under the pertinent provisions of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.40)
3) Comments
Enacted in August 2001,41) the CRPA is a Korean law providing a statutory
framework for corporate restructurings and out-of-court workouts under a creditor
financial institutions’ council.42) Under the CRPA, the main creditor bank, “which is
chosen by the creditors themselveswithout direction or control by the GOK” runs the
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creditors’ council and spearheads the corporate restructuring efforts.43) In the event of
discord among the creditors, a Creditor Financial Institutions Mediating Committee
(“Committee”) consisting of private experts in corporate restructuring, can be set up
to serve as a mediator.44)
Any role for government under the CRPA? 
Under the CRPA, no statutory authority is conferred on any government agency.
In addition, mediating or observing functions under the Act exclusively belong to the
Committee, not to any public authority. Article 31 of the CRPA provides that a
Committee, which is made up of seven professionals, may be formed for the purpose
of implementing the effective reorganization of the distressed company and for
ironing out or mediating differences in opinion within the creditors group.
Furthermore, the government has no role to play in enforcing the CRPA or any
decisions made thereunder by the Creditor’s Council. In terms of minority protection,
any creditor financial institution that takes issue with the Committee’s decision can
subsequently seek mediation or judicial review.45)
4. Further Note on Legislation in the Context of Financial Reform
In their respective final determinations, the U.S. and E.C. both determined that
technically insolvent, yet viable companies such as Hynix should have been allowed
to go bankrupt.46) At least the Panel in US-DRAMSquestioned the wisdom of this
common finding by taking the view that, unlike what the DOC had found, certain of
43) Hynix, Case Brief in DRAMs from Korea — CVD Investigation(May 2003), at 14 (emphasis original). 
44) See generallyGOK, Supplemental Questionnaire Response in the DOC CVD investigation of Hynix(2003),
at 59-66.
45) In respect of mediation rights, Article 29(5) of the CRPA provides:
“[w]here the consultation under paragraph (4) is not attained, the mediation committee under Article shall make
a decision on the price of purchase or redemption of claims and conditions thereof. In such case, the mediation
committee shall take into consideration  the price computed by an accounting specialist selected under a consultation
between the council and opposing creditors by evaluating the value of the relevant enterprise with insolvency signs
and the possibility for implementing the agreement, as well as the situation of funds of purchase institutions”.
46) For instance, the EC stated that: “(t)he European Communities does not consider that what happened to
Hynix happened according to the normal application of generally applicable bankruptcy laws” Seepara. 556 of the
First Written Submissionof the EC in EC DRAMS.
Journal of Korean Law, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2007
236
Hynix’s creditors were not directed or entrusted by the Korean government to
financially prop up Hynix. Yet the Appellate Body subsequently reversed this Panel
ruling reinstating thereby the initial U.S. view on the issue. In so doing, the Appellate
Body seems to have implicitly acknowledged and endorsed the notion that the proper
antidote for ailing companies even with reasonable prospects of viability such as
Hynix,47) was the U.S.-style liquidation, rather than any form of corporate
restructuring. However, it is suggested that such proposition is troubling for the
following reasons.
First, the problem with such view is that it does not accurately reflect or accord
with what happened in Korea in terms of corporate restructuring subsequent to the
financial crisis in 1997.48) Especially in respect of restructuring chaebol,49) Korea has
heavily relied on corporate reorganization and out-of-court workout procedures,
rather than liquidation. More specifically, among the firms that went insolvent in
1997, the vast majority of the top thirty chaebolentered into the corporate
reorganization procedure. With the introduction of a government-initiated out-of-
court workout procedure in 1998, the workout program gained extra momentum and
became the most prevalent form of restructuring for large cha bol. By 1999, most of
the new bankruptcies (in terms of assets) were now handled through out-of-court
procedures.
In this connection, it is also noted that Korean bankruptcy law generally favours
corporate reorganization over liquidation. As Mikyung Yun alludes to: “Between
corporate reorganization and composition, the former is favored to the latter. This is
apparent from the priority the court gives to corporate reorganization. Once a
corporate reorganization is approved, application for composition or bankruptcy
cannot be filed. Further, application for corporate reorganization overrides
47) In this regard, Citibank, Hynix’s financial consultant during 2001, stated that “it decided to stay involved
with Hynix because it could get a better recovery value if they stayed involved with Hynix for the long haul.
Moreover, Citibank still thought Hynix could be a viable going concern, which is why Citibank decided to invest
more funds as part of the October restructuring …. According to Citibank officials, although its investment decisions
in Hynix did not work out, Citibank made its decisions to invest following Citibank’s standard investment procedures
and based completely on commercial considerations”.  Korea, First Written Submissioni  US DRAMS(April, 2004)
(hereinafter “GOK First Written Submission”), para. 534 (emphasis original).  
48) SeeHaggard, Lim and Kim, et al. Economic Crisis and Corporate Restructuring in Korea(2003), at 211-16. 
49) A “chaebol” is a Korean term for a conglomerate of several companies clustered around a single holding
company. 
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composition, even if the latter has already been applied for or is in process.”50) The
same point is reinforced by James L. Garrity and Karen P. Ramdhanie when they
state that: “… in Korea the perception continues that bankruptcy and, to a lesser
extent, reorganization are socially unacceptable.”51)
Second, the US view that “technically insolvent” companies should be liquidated,
rather than restructured or reorganized as in the case of Hynix is problematic in that it
accords undue supremacy to one form of corporate reorganization over another.52)
Also, in the absence of any definitive determination or pronouncement at an
international level that Korea’s choice of corporate restructuring or out-of-court
workout as the prime vehicle for revamping large conglomerates was incompatible
per sewith established international norms or legal obligations, such view lacks legal
coherence and force. In this regard, it is noted that corporate reorganization in Korea
in general and the CRPA in particular were modelled after the “London Approach” to
corporate work out procedures. This particular approach to management
normalization was recommended to Korea by the IMF as a way of trailblazing
reform in the wake of Korea’s liquidity crisis.53) As Korea pointed out in the US
DRAMSproceeding:
Partly because of the cumbersome nature of Korea’s bankruptcy laws, the
Korean government has often employed a restructuring process that is outside
the judicial system known as the London Approach. Developed in the United
Kingdom over the last 25 years as a non-statutory market-led system for
corporate workouts, the London Approach has been widely used in the United
Kingdom since the early 1990s to rejuvenate distressed companies. The
London Approach has been useful for solvent companies facing a cash flow
50) Mikyung Yun, A Primer on Korean Bankruptcy Law, Am. Bankruptcy Inst. J. (June 1999).
51) James L. Garrity and Karen P. Ramdhanie, Korean Bankruptcy Law: the Heavy Duty Hypothetical Applied,
New York L. J. of Int. & Comp. L. (1997), at 281.
52) In addition, what is problematic with such US-EC view is that “under such theory, a reasonable investor
only looks at narrow financial indicators.  This view thus precludes a reasonable investor from considering broader
economic factors. The US view also precludes a reasonable investor from having a different perspective as an “inside
investor.” For example, under their view, a bank that has a large amount of outstanding debt is not allowed to
consider the effect of a new loan on the probability of recovering the existing loan. Given the rather narrow focus of
the U.S.-style “reasonable investor,” that investor is almost applying a per serule.” SeeKorea, Answers to the Panel
Questions(July 2004) in US DRAMS, at 5.
53) The “London Approach” has been implemented in several countries with less developed bankruptcy systems
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crisis and is voluntary.  As described by Michael Smith of the Bank of
England, “The London Approach … is flexible framework which enables
banks and other interested parties to reach well-based decisions about whether
and on what terms a company in financial difficulty might be allowed to
survive.” The London Approach has been used in corporate restructuring in
Korea because of its advantageous features, such as flexibility, and because it
avoids an actual bankruptcy for the distressed firms. An additional advantage
is that the approach leads to fewer workers being laid off and hence a lower
rate of unemployment than would otherwise be the case.54)
Hence, just because Korea chose a particular restructuring model provides no
ground or reason to “condemn this approach to corporate workouts, which was
deemed a more efficient and less costly alternative to traditional bankruptcy
proceedings.”55)
III. Related Legal Instruments - Securities Prospectuses
In addition to the legislations considered above, in support of its finding that
Korea could and indeed did influence the lending behavior of privately held banks,
the USDOC considered the conduct of Kookmin Bank. According to the US, this
particular bank, which had less than 10 percent government ownership,56) admitted in
sworn disclosure documents to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) that its lending decisions could be subject to government influence.  More
specifically: 
(I)n September 2001, Kookmin Bank and Housing and Commercial Bank
(two Hynix creditors that were merging to form the New Kookmin during the
period of investigation) filed a prospectus with the SEC. Kookmin
where “voluntary workouts organized by creditors often preserve more value for the creditors than forced
bankruptcies and liquidation of the debtor’s assets”. Seepara. 336 of GOK First Written Submission. 
54) Robert F. Emery, Korean Economic Reform140 (2001), quoted in Id., at 567.
55) Id.
56) During the period of DOC investigation, Kookmin was 65% foreign owned.
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acknowledged in the Risks Relating to Government Regulation and Policy
Section of this prospectus:
The Korean government promotes lending to certain types of borrowers as a
matter of policy, which New Kookmin may feel compelled to follow…. In
addition, the Korean Government has, and will continue to, as a matter of
policy, attempt to promote lending to certain types of borrowers. It generally
has done this by identifying qualifying borrowers and making low interest
loans available to banks and financial institutions who lend to those qualifying
borrowers. The government has in this manner promoted low-income
mortgage lending and lending to technology companies. We expect that all
loans made pursuant to government policies will be reviewed in accordance
with New Kookmin’s credit review policies. However, we cannot assure you
that government policy will not influence New Kookmin to lend to certain
sectors or in a manner in which New Kookmin otherwise would not in the
absence of the government policy.
In June 2002, Kookmin made another submission to the SEC in anticipation
of the issuance of American depository shares (ADS s) coordinated by
Goldman Sachs.  This submission contained language virtually identical to the
first prospectus:
The Korean government promotes lending to certain types of borrowers as a
matter of policy, which we may feel compelled to follow. The Korean
Government has promoted, and, as a matter of policy, may continue to attempt
to promote lending to certain types of borrowers. It generally has done this by
requesting banks to participate in remedial programs for troubled corporate
borrowers and by identifying sectors of the economy it wishes to promote and
making low interest loans available to banks and financial institutions who
lend to borrowers in these sectors. The government has in this manner
promoted low-income mortgage lending and lending to high technology
companies. We expect that all loans made pursuant to government policies will
be reviewed in accordance with our credit review policies. However,
government policy may influence us to lend to certain sectors or in a manner
in which we would not in the absence of the government policy.57)
According to the US submission, all companies entering the U.S. securities
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57) U.S. First Written Submission, paras 70-71 (emphasis original).
58) US DRAMS, para 7.163.  
59) Id.
60) Id., at 7.164. 
61) Id.
62) U.S. Department of Commerce, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Results in the First
Administrative Review of the Countervailing Duty Order on DRAMS from Korea, 71 FR 14174 (March 21, 2006),
available atwais.access.gpo.gov (hereinafter “First CVD Review”).
markets are required to file a prospectus regardless of nationality. The purpose of
such prospectus is to warn prospective investors of all material risks associated with
their contemplated investment. According to the US, the SEC mandates the use of
“plain English” in the issuance of prospectuses. Namely, prospectuses are to be
drafted in such a way that all risk factors are articulated in a “clear, concise and
understandable” manner.58) In deference to this SEC approach, the DOC undertook
its review of the Kookmin prospectuses on a “plain reading” of the language used
therein.59)
The Panel, however, was not persuaded that a plain reading of the two Kookmin
prospectuses somehow bore out GOK entrustment or direction in respect of any
Hynix creditor. Rather, a plain reading of those documents indicated that “the GOK
has sought to promote lending to certain types of borrowers, and that it had done so
by requesting banks to participate in remedial programmes, and making low interest
loans available to them” as appropriate.60)
According to the Panel, what was plain in the prospectuses was that the GOK
pursued certain fiscal policies by means of requests to banks to provide low interest
loans. In the Panel’s opinion, such conduct entailed a legitimate form of government
prudential policy, as opposed to an affirmative act of delegation or command within
the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement. Accordingly, an
objective and impartial investigating authority could not have found that the
language of the two Kookmin prospectuses reasonably evidenced GOK entrustment
or direction for the benefit of Hynix.61)
In addition to the Kookmin prospectuses, USDOC considered Form 20-F
submitted to the SEC by Woori Finance Holdings Co. (“WFHC”) in September 2003
in their first CVD administrative review on Hynix DRAMS.62) Woori Bank, which is
a subsidiary of WFHC, participated in the May 2001 restructuring measure (by
purchasing convertible bonds) and in the October 2001 restructuring program (in the
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form of new loans and debt swapped for equity) of Hynix.63)
In respect of GOK pressure to lend to certain strategic industries, WFHC’s Form
20-F included a statement to the effect that: 
The KDIC, which is our controlling shareholder, is controlled by the Korean
government and could cause us to take actions or pursue policy objectives that
may be against your interests. The Korean government, through the KDIC,
currently owns 86.8% of our outstanding common stock. So long as the
Korean government remains our controlling stockholder, it will have the
ability to cause us to take actions or pursue policy objectives that may conflict
with the interests of our other stockholders. For example, in order to further its
public policy goals, the Korean government could request that we participate
with respect to a takeover of a troubled financial institution or encourage us to
provide financial support to particular entities or sectors. Such actions or
others that are not consistent with maximizing our profits or the value of our
common stock may have an adverse impact on our results of operations and
financial condition and may cause the price of our common stock and ADSs to
decline ….64)
WFHC’s 20-F further states in terms of risks relating to government regulation:
The Korean government promotes lending and financial support by the
Korean financial industry to certain types of borrowers as a matter of policy,
which financial institutions, including us, may decide to follow. Through its
policy guidelines and recommendations, the Korean government has
promoted and, as a matter of policy, may continue to attempt to promote
lending by the Korean financial industry to particular types of borrowers. For
example, the Korean government has in the past announced policy guidelines
requesting financial institutions to participate in remedial programs for
troubled corporate borrowers, as well as policies identifying sectors of the
63) Hanvit Bank, the predecessor of Woori Bank, received a capital injection of 2.7644 trillion KRW from the
KDIC, a government-affiliated organization, in the form of stock holding. Later, all of the KDIC shares were
transferred to WFHC in April 2001, and the bank became a subsidiary of WFHC. As of 2001, WFHC was 100
percent owned by the KDIC, and the KDIC indirectly held full ownership of the bank through the holding company.
Hanvit Bank changed its name to Woori Bank in May 2002.
64) First CVD Review, at 54531.
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economy it wishes to promote and making low interest funding available to
financial institutions that lend to these sectors. The government has in this
manner encouraged low-income mortgage lending and lending to small- and
medium-sized enterprises and technology companies. We expect that all loans
or credits made pursuant to these government policies will be reviewed in
accordance with our credit approval procedures. However, these or any future
government policies may influence us to lend to certain sectors or in a manner
in which we otherwise would not in the absence of that policy.65)
According to the USDOC, WFHC’s SEC disclosure was a smoking-gun proof of
GOK control of GOK-owned or controlled banks with respect to their lending
decisions involving Hynix in that such filing is “subject to stringent transparency
rules designed to protect investors, and the veracity of the accompanying statements
entails serious litigation and liability risk for the company.”66)
Interestingly, WFHC’s 20-F was also considered in Japan’s recent CVD
investigation involving Hynix.67) In that case,68) in light of this disclosure document
and others, the Japanese Minister of Finance (“MOF”) found it probable that the
policy of GOK could influence the credit decisions of commercial banks. Especially
where the GOK is the controlling shareholder, the MOF determined, the GOK could
cause the bank to pursue certain policy objectives that might collide with the interests
of non-government stakeholders. Based on these facts on the record, the MOF found
a legal framework in Korea under which the government could lord it over individual
banks and their lending activities.69)
65) Id.
66) Id., at 54531.
67) The Final Determination with respect to the Investigation under Article 7, Paragraph 6 of the Customs Tariff
Law (Law No. 54 of 1910) (Ministry of Finance Notification No. 352 of August 4, 2004) on DRAMS from the
Republic of Korea (hereinafter “MOF Final Determination”) announced in Cabinet Order No. 13 and Ministry of
Finance Notice No. 35, published respectively in Issue No. 4264 and Special Issue No. 17 of the Official Gazette
dated 27 January 2006. 
68) Japan launched an anti-subsidy investigation against the GOK and Hynix in August 2004 and issued a final
affirmative determination in early January, 2006 making it Japan’s first countervailing duties.
69) Id. paras 85-87. 
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1. Appellate Body finding on the Kookmin Prospectuses
During the Appellate Body proceeding, the U.S. contended that the Panel had
employed a “piecemeal approach” to analyzing the DOC finding on direction and
entrustment as exemplified by the Panel treatment of the Kookmin prospectus.70) In
the Appellate Body’s view, on the basis of the admission by Kookmin Bank that
“government policy” might lead it to extend loans that it otherwise might not offer,
and also given the existence of an ongoing GOK policy to save Hynix,71) the Panel
should have considered, as did the USDOC, whether the Kookmin Bank
prospectuses could be considered relevant in the context of the totality of all
evidence,72) rather than in isolation or by itself.73)
2. Comments on the Kookmin Prospectus 
As has been noted, the US DRAMS Panel refused to consider the Kookmin
Prospectus as tangible proof of GOK direction or entrustment of Hynix creditors.
The Appellate Body, on the other hand, castigated the Panel for not strictly following
the holistic approach of the DOC to record evidence whereby the prospectus was to
be evaluated as but an element of the universe of evidence before the agency. Yet
what the Appellate Body failed to observe in this regard is that despite Kookmin’s
issuance of the prospectus in September 2001, Kookmin, in fact, did not participate
in the October 2001 restructuring of Hynix by refusing to extend any additional new
loans. As such, in so far as the October restructuring is concerned, Kookmin’s actual
70) DRAMS AB Report, para 20. 
71) For instance, in its published determination, the DOC stated:
[t]he GOK had a policy to prevent Hynix’ failure. The GOK attached such great importance to Hynix’ survival
because it feared that the company’s collapse would have serious repercussions for the ROK’s corporate, labour and
financial markets, and because Hynix was part of an industry sector considered to be of ‘strategic’ importance to the
GOK. Decision Memorandum,at 37. 
72) In this respect, the Appellate Body noted that:
(R)equiring that each piece of circumstantial evidence, on its own, establish entrustment or direction effectively
precludes an agency from finding entrustment or direction on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Individual pieces
of circumstantial evidence, by their very nature, are not likely to establish a proposition, unless and until viewed in
conjunction with other pieces of evidence. DRAMS AB Report,para 150. 
73) Id., para 155.
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actions belie the DOC determination that the prospectus constituted “direct evidence
of an explicit and affirmative command by the GOK to Hynix creditors.”74)
In the WTO dispute settlement context, the Kookmin prospectus was also
considered in Korea-Shipbuilding. In that case, Korea contended that Kookmin’s
statement in the prospectus pertained to GOK promotion of low-income mortgages
and lending to technology companies, not to the shipbuilding sector. In support of
this claim, Korea submitted a letter from Kookmin’s lawyers75) explaining that the
prospectus “does not state, nor was it intended to imply, that the Korean government
exercises control over the banking sector generally or over bank lending decisions
either generally or with respect to particular borrowers such as Hynix.”76)
In reviewing the prospectus language itself, the shipbuilding Panel accepted
Korea’s claim that it was actually made in respect of GOK promotion of low-interest
mortgages and loans to technology firms. In the view of the Panel, therefore, the
prospectuses did not prove that Kookmin was led or coerced by the government into
the restructuring of shipyards.  In addition, the Panel pointed out that the prospectus
referred to GOK “requesting” banks to take part in remedial measures for distressed
corporations.  In the absence of any other probative material, the Panel opined, a
mere government “request” will not amount to entrustment or direction, since such
request lacks the requisite elements of delegation or command.77)
IV. Conclusion — Implications
According to the FSS, a total of eight Korean corporations are listed on the New
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) as of March, 2007.78) They are: POSCO, SK
Telecom, Korea Telecom, Kookmin Bank, WFHC, LG Philips LCD, Shinhan
Financial Holding Group (“SFHG”), and Korea Electric Power Corporation. The
number of financial institutions among these NYSE traded Korean entities is three
consisting of Kookmin, arguably the largest commercial lender in Korea,79) WFHC
74) First Written Submission of the GOK in US DRAMS, para 439. 
75) The law firm of Cleary Gottlieb. 
76) Korea-Shipbuilding, para 7.396.
77) Id. para 7.397.
78) FSS, Press Release(March 2007), available athttp:// www.fss.or.kr.  
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and SFHG the respective subsidiary banks of which form the Big Four together with
Kookmin and Hana Bank.80)
As has bee noted above, Kookmin and WFHC stated in their respective SEC
disclosures that government influence can shape the contours of their lending
decisions. As for Shinhan Bank, which forms part of SFHG, the EC has recently
determined in the context of Hynix’s October 2001 restructuring programme that the
GOK was capable of wielding “considerable influence” over the bank as its largest
shareholder holding more than 18% equity stakes.81) Given the status and size of
these financial institutions, it should come as no surprise that the banking and
financial sector of Korea can be considered susceptible to governmental pressure and
control in the eyes of international investors, particularly in the area of lending policy
related to technology firms.82)
Aside from the commercial banks, the U.S. has expressed concerns about the role
played by policy lending banks in government support of selected Korean industries.
In the view of the U.S., the participation of these banks, among which the KDB in
particular, in the Hynix restructuring signaled GOK support for the ailing
chipmaker.83) Determined to be a public body by the US and EC trade remedy
authorities alike,84) the KDB has been active in its support to “foster technology-
79) Bloomberg News, South Korea’s Biggest Lender Gets Bigger, available at   http://www.dbs.com/newsroom/
2002/press020326.html.
80) See Moon Ihlwan, South Korea — A Great place to be a Bank, available athttp://www.business
week.com/magazine/content/05_45/b3958131.htm. 
81) European Council, COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 584/2006 of 10 April 2006 amending Regulation
(EC) No 1480/2003 imposing a definitive countervailing duty and collecting definitely the provisional duty imposed
on imports of certain electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in
the Republic of Korea, available ateuropa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/oj, recital 20.
82) In connection with possible GOK direction of credit for Korean financial institutions, the DOC recently took
the view that, in 2004, “GOK influence may have been directed at LG Card”, a credit card company operating in
Korea. This view was based upon Kookmin’s SEC filing that “in light of the financial market instability in Korea
resulting from the liquidity problems faced by credit card companies during the first quarter of 2003, the Korean
government announced temporary measures intended to provide liquidity support to credit card companies”. See
DOC, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Results in the Second Administrative Review of the
Countervailing Duty Order on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors from the Republic of Korea, 72
FR 7015 (February 14, 2007), available at wais.access.gpo.gov, at 25. 
83) First CVD Review, at 54532.
84) For example, KDB was determined by the USDOC to be a public body because: 1) its shares are wholly
owned by the GOK, 2) the bank’s purpose is to supply and manage major industrial funds with a view to promoting
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intensive industries including semiconductors.”85) In respect of Hynix, the KDB
participated in both the May and October 2001 remedial measures while
implementing a bond-purchase program which was found de factospecific to Hynix
and Hyundai Group in general.86) With respect to the KDB, the US Trade
Representative (“USTR”) noted in their recent annual report that: 
More specifically, the U.S. Government has expressed concerns about the role
played by the government-owned Korea Development Bank (KDB) in
supporting certain Korean industries. Historically, the KDB, which as a
government-owned entity is not necessarily bound by the same constraints as
commercial institutions, has been one of the government’s main sources for
policy-directed lending to favored industries. U.S. industries have reported
that lending and equity investments by the KDB have contributed to
overcapacity in certain Korean industries. The U.S. Government will continue
to monitor the lending policies of the KDB and other government-owned or
affiliated financial institutions.87)
Lessons for Korea here would be, first of all, minimizing “government
intervention that impedes commercialization.”88) In this respect, the Korean
government might find it necessary to completely privatize the commercial banks in
which it had acquired an ownership stake to varying degrees in the aftermath of the
1997 crisis, since such privatization will signal an affirmative step towards
the overall well-being of the Korean economy; 3) the government is heavily involved with its day-to-day
management. See Decision Memorandum, p. 16.
85) Available at http://www.kdb.co.kr. In this respect, Article 18.2 of the KDB Act provides in pertinent part
that the KDB may “lend funds which are to be employed in the development of high-technology for major industries
….”
86) Referring the KDB Fast Track/Debenture Program. The EC determined the program to be de factospecific
to Hynix in the meaning of Article 3(2)(c) of the basic Regulation because: i) the program was predominantly used
by Hyundai Group companies including Hynix; ii) Hynix had used more than 40 percent of the funds available under
the program. SeeEuropean Council., COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1480/2003 of 11 August 2003 imposing a
definitive countervailing duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain
electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in the Republic of Korea,
available ateuropa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/oj/, recital 65.
87) USTR, The National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers(2007), at 362.
88) Thomas Byrne, The Korean Banking System Six Years after the Crisis, available athttp://www.keia.org/2-
Publications/2-2-Economy/Economy2004/Byrne.pdf.
remedying the unfortunate perception that the GOK is still tinkering with the lending
decisions of privately held commercial lenders.89) In respect to the policy lending
banks, there have been recent press reports that talks are under way to turn the KDB
into a holding company and then have it privatized eventually in due course.90) If
implemented, these steps will certainly go a long way towards transforming the
image of the KDB as an executor par excellenceof GOK financial policies and
economic mandates.
KEY WORD: Hynix, Corporate Restructuring, Korean Liquidity Crisis, World
Trade Organization 
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89) A prime example here would be Korea Exchange Bank, the lead bank on Hynix’s Creditors Council.
During the period of DOC investigation, the KEB was majority owned by the GOK.  In 2004, however, Lone Star, a
private equity fund in Texas, U.S., became the bank’s majority shareholder by purchasing 51 percent of KEB shares.
90) Available athttp://news.mk.co.kr/newsRead.php?year=2007&no=117642.
